An economic analysis of money follows the patient by McElroy, Brendan & Murphy, Aileen
Title An economic analysis of money follows the patient
Author(s) McElroy, Brendan; Murphy, Aileen
Publication date 2013-12-06
Original citation McElroy, B. and Murphy, A. (2014) 'An economic analysis of money
follows the patient', Irish Journal of Medical Science, 183(1), pp. 15-22.
doi:10.1007/s11845-013-1050-7
Type of publication Article (peer-reviewed)
Link to publisher's
version
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11845-013-1050-7
Access to the full text of the published version may require a
subscription.
Rights © Royal Academy of Medicine in Ireland 2013. The final publication
is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11845-013-
1050-7
Item downloaded
from
http://hdl.handle.net/10468/3513
Downloaded on 2017-02-12T06:33:42Z
1 
 
An Economic Analysis of Money Follows the Patient  
Dr. Brendan McElroy
* 
Lecturer 
School of Economics 
University College Cork 
Western Road 
Cork 
021-4902632 
Dr. Aileen Murphy 
Lecturer 
School of Economics 
University College Cork 
Western Road 
Cork 
021-4903489 
 
*Corresponding Author 
 
 
  
2 
 
An Economic Analysis of Money Follows the Patient 
1. Introduction 
The Irish Government’s radical plans to re-design the Irish health care system were outlined 
in the Department of Health strategy document Future Health [1] and subsequent policy 
documents [2-4].  As part of the proposed changes, the Department of Health [3] outlined a 
new funding model for publically funded Irish hospitals – Money Follows the Patient 
(MFTP). This would mean a shift from the current model of a prospective block grant to 
retrospective activity based funding (ABF), whereby episodes of care will be funded rather 
than hospitals themselves. Thus, hospital revenue will be directly linked to activity, resulting 
in a shift in incentives. It is proposed that MFTP be fully implemented by 2014. This paper 
reviews the current system and the principal weaknesses therein; outlines the new model; 
examines the principal economic issues anticipated with its introduction; describes some 
feasibility issues specific to Ireland and provides conclusions. 
 
2. Review of Current System  
To date funding for Irish hospitals has been predominately prospective, whereby hospitals 
receive an historic block grant. Since 1993 with the introduction of the ‘National Casemix 
Programme’ there has been modest progress towards ABF through the introduction of 
diagnostic related groups (DRGs) in the largest Irish hospitals [5, 6].  Over time the number 
of DRGs employed has increased and its application has broadened to include inpatient and 
day case activity. In addition, there has been an increase in both the number of hospitals 
involved in the programme and in the proportion of funding received through the programme 
by hospitals (15% in 2000 to 80% by 2011 [7]). Consequently, by 2011 80% of hospitals’ 
inpatient funding was based on the national average costs of its case-mix adjusted peer group, 
rather than its own costs [5]. However peer-groups are large which dilutes case-mix 
adjustments to the extent that hospital budgets are still predominantly generated by historic 
cost on a prospective basis [8]. (For detailed description of Irish hospital system and hospital 
financing see Wiley [6] and incentives therein see Brick et al. [9]). 
 
3. Money Follows the Patient 
The proposed MFTP system will fund episodes of care, not hospitals. Therefore, hospital 
revenue will be a direct consequence of a hospital’s activity, adjusted for case complexity, 
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and the link to the historic budget will be broken. ABF has been adopted in over 25 countries 
worldwide [10] including Medicare in the US, the NHS in England [11] and many health 
systems in Europe [12, 13]. 
Department of Health [3] set out the governance structures for the proposed MFTP system. 
This is presented in Figure 1. Under MFTP two new entities will be established. Firstly, the 
Health Care Commissioning Agency will be established. It will have responsible for the 
purchasing function, namely negotiating contracts with hospitals regarding cost, volume of 
activity and potentially performance against quality indicators. This agency will also pay 
hospitals quarterly on a case mix basis [4]. Secondly, an independent National Information 
and Price Office for the price setting function will be established. 
 
Figure 1 Money Follows the Patient, Governance Structure  
 
Source: Adapted from Department of Health [3] 
 
Figure 2 presents the resource and information flows within the new structure. It is proposed 
that hospitals will collate patient level costing data and report this to a newly formed National 
Information and Price Office on a regular basis. In the interim, these patient level cost and 
activity data will be utilised by the National Information and Price Office to set prices for 
episodes of care and in the long term, the cost of best practice guidelines will form the basis 
of prices. Episodes of care will be defined using the pre-existing Hospital Inpatient Enquiry 
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Scheme (HIPE) (see ESRI [14] for description) and related Australian Refined DRG (AR-
DRG) grouper initially. There will also be an outlier payment mechanism, based on length of 
stay thresholds, to take exceptionally high cost cases into consideration [3]. The prices will 
include all pay and non-pay costs; diagnostic, medical services and associated overhead costs 
and costs associated with clinical indemnity schemes. Capital, depreciation, superannuation 
and bad debts will be excluded initially [3]. 
Once the Minister for Health approves the prices, they will be presented to the Health Care 
Commissioning Agency along with the global hospital budget. The Minister also will ensure 
that appropriate legislation is in place for the smooth running of the financing system. 
Hospital Groups and the Health Care Commissioning Agency will agree contracts on activity 
and quality. Hospital Groups will be paid retrospectively on a quarterly basis by the Agency. 
 
Figure 2  Money Follows the Patient, Data and Resource Flows 
 
DoH = Department of Health  
Source: Adapted from Department of Health [4] 
 
It is proposed that MFTP will apply to episodes of care provided in medical assessment 
unit/acute medical assessment unit/acute medical unit, clinical decision units, day ward or 
Minster/ DoH 
Healthcare 
Commissioning 
Agency 
Hospital 
Groups 
National 
Information & 
Pricing Office 
Costs + Best Practice 
Guidelines = Prices 
Prices, global 
hospital budget 
Performance contracts 
Retrospective payments Costs 
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inpatient ward and all comparable episodes of care which are or could be delivered on an 
outpatient basis [4].  Emergency services (including emergency department and minor injury 
units), outreach services, as well as teaching and research costs will be excluded. In addition, 
owing to complexities, outpatient services ancillary to an episode of care are to be considered 
outside the main bundle payment, though this arrangement will be reviewed. Furthermore,  
while it is envisaged that mental health should be considered in a similar manner to other 
episodes of care, given its complexity it will be phased in at a later date [3].  
 
4. Principal Economic Issues with MFTP 
MFTP does not fund hospitals; it funds episodes of care, which establishes a direct link 
between the hospital’s activity and its revenue [15]. This contrasts with the current system 
and is a boon to understanding the system for all stakeholders from taxpayer and patient 
through to manager and clinician. Moving from a system where hospitals were constrained to 
spending within a fixed budget, to one where a hospital has to generate its own revenue 
causes significantly changes to the incentive structure for hospitals, as well as other providers 
and purchasers in the health system. 
ABF systems generate incentives to increase number of patients treated, reduce cost per case 
[11] and increase the quality of coding [16, 17]. However, unintended and less desirable 
incentives emerge, include skimping on quality, which imposes pressures on other parts of 
the health system [11, 18, 19], upcoding [19, 20] and cream-skimming [18, 19]. As well as 
these there are additional economic issues associated with MFTP such as its role in increasing 
competition between hospitals; the effects of procedure pricing on behaviour; distorting 
health system priorities and the role of economic evaluation in designing best practice 
pathways. This section discusses the advantages and disadvantages for each issue where 
relevant and provides supporting evidence.  
 
Reducing cost per case 
Establishing a regime whereby hospitals get paid for activity delivered may shift their 
objective function to revenue maximisation from delivery of Service Level Agreements 
within a fixed budget. If so, hospitals will seek to maximise their revenues by generating as 
many (non-lossmaking) episodes of care per annum as possible. This has the advantage of 
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increasing volume with the potential to reduce cost per episode in a number of ways. First, it 
allows fixed costs to be spread over a greater number of episodes. Second, it may allow 
greater ‘learning by doing’, that is, clinical teams may deliver outcomes at reduced length of 
stay, so that as the volume of episodes increase, clinical practices become more routine, for 
instance. Third, there is a greater incentive to use resources more intensively, by increasing 
the use of day wards for instance. 
However, there may also be disadvantages. These include early discharging [15, 21], 
including from high dependency wards to general wards or from hospital altogether. The 
former would have implications on the quality of care and consequent speed and quality of 
recovery for patients. The latter places greater demand on services in the community, such as 
primary care and long term care.  
Similarly, there are greater incentives to discharge so called ‘bed blockers’ i.e. those who are 
medically fit for discharge but have not been discharged, typically because they are awaiting 
beds in long-term care settings or the establishment of appropriate home supports.  Gallagher 
et al. [22] found that these represented 2,436 bed days or approximately 4% of the total bed 
days available in one Irish general hospital.  These patients represent a barrier to the hospital 
admitting more patients and therefore earning additional revenue under MFTP, given that 
according to DoH [3:32]  ‘[e]pisode of care begins at point of admission and ends when 
patient is deemed medically fit for discharge”. This also puts additional demands on services 
in the community.  
The MFTP proposal [3] and supporting documentation [4] somewhat neglects services in the 
community [23]. The Department of Health [3:31] states that acute to step-down or long-term 
care requires ‘very careful consideration’   but does not elaborate on these considerations. 
Proposals to enhance the integration of acute services and services in the community , such as 
universal general practice (GP) care free from fees and increased number of Primary Care 
centres (many of which have low levels of GP involvement), have progressed slowly.   
It is proposed that MFTP be rolled out to the remainder of the health system so that funds can 
follow the patient out of the hospital via an integrated payment system [1]. This concept has 
been tested in the US. For example, Casale et al. [24] report its use on coronary artery bypass 
grafting wherein outcomes improved and resource use decreased.  Details on how this would 
function for the Irish health care system however are not addressed under the MFTP 
proposals.  
7 
 
Evidence on the net outcome of these incentives is mixed. There is some Irish and 
international evidence to suggest ABF results in increased volumes and/or reductions in 
length of stay. For example, according to Minster Reilly, when MFTP was piloted in number 
of Orthopaedic sites in Ireland volume increased and length of stay reduced [25, 26] by 
approximately two days [27]. Similarly, in England following the introduction of ‘Payment 
by Results’ (PbR) in the NHS, modest increases in volumes and ratio of day cases to inpatient 
were found [11]. In addition, average lengths of stay reduced (by 0.8 days) as did unit costs 
without changes in quality [11]. However, the quality indicators used lacked, by the authors’ 
own admission, the specificity needed to properly test the effect of PbR on patient care [11]. 
Moreover, observed volume increases have also been attributed to increased government 
pressure at the time to reduce waiting times for non-emergency care [11]. A similar finding 
was reported by Kjerstad [28].  Also, where hospitals are already operating at full (or near 
full) capacity there is little scope to increase volume [19]. 
A key concern discussed above is the increased pressure MFTP could place on services in the 
community. According to Sussex and Farrar [19] in a survey of health managers, this was 
less of a concern in the NHS owing to the close relationship and altruistic culture between 
hospital trusts and primary care trusts (PCTs). Those surveyed felt that both hospital trusts 
and PCTs took joint responsibility for the local health economy, focusing on serving patients 
rather than advancing the interest of individual organisations at the expense of others [19]. In 
Ireland, Ruane [29] referred to Primary, Community and Continuing Care (PCCC) structures 
as being fragmented, with a mix of public and private hospitals and public and private payers. 
Thus, responsibility for the local health economy is presumably more obscure than Sussex 
and Farrar [19] found for the UK. 
Other measures which could be taken in the Irish system to ensure quality of care is not 
compromised under MFTP include firstly, the adoption of best practice clinical pathways 
earlier rather than later and their inclusion in contracts between the Health Care 
Commissioning Agency and the Hospital Groups, coupled with clinical audit. Secondly, 
contracts should include warranties to purchasers on episodes of care completed. For 
instance, any same-diagnosis re-admission within a specified time period should not be paid 
for more than once or even a discount should be applied to the initial payment, if the 
purchaser was particularly keen on maintaining quality standards. 
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Potential for efficient reallocation of resources 
Owing to the inherent transparency of MFTP it would be readily identifiable which hospitals 
make profits on each episode of care. Consider hip replacements as an example: Table 1 
shows an extract from the Irish National Casemix Programme report on DRG costs [30]. The 
majority of hip replacements are classified to I03B, which have an average cost per case of 
€10,931, and average length of stay of 8.88 days.  Under the interim arrangements for 
pricing, as proposed in the Department of Health [3], €10,931 would represent the price paid 
for all hip replacements coded to I03B. The ‘low’ of 4 and ‘high’ of 19 represent the lowest 
and highest lengths of stay that would receive this price. Therefore there is considerable 
variation in length of stay, and presumably cost, around the average. Upon collation of 
patient level data at the National Information and Pricing Office, hospitals making losses on 
hip replacements, perhaps by having a higher than  average length of stay, would be easily 
identified, as would hospitals making profits on hip replacements. Thus, notwithstanding the 
potential for political interference, MFTP may lead to a more efficient allocation of resources 
by allowing hospitals that are efficient at performing hip replacements to do more of them 
and those that are inefficient to perform less. 
Table 1 Cost and length of stay of Hip Replacement cases, 2011 
ARDRG Description  N Inpatient casemix 
cost per case (€) 
Avg. 
LOS 
Low  High  
I03A Hip Replacement +CCC 368 20,096 29.78 13 47 
I03B Hip Replacement -CCC 4,298 10,931 8.88 4 19 
Notes: 1. ARDRG is Australian Refined Diagnostic Related Group 
 2. CCC is catastrophic complication and/or comorbidity 
Source: National Casemix Programme, 2013. 
 
Sussex and Farrar [19], in an early examination of the effects of PbR, found that its 
introduction made loss-making activities more readily identified, but that they did not cease 
immediately. 
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Opportunities for Gaming: Cream-skimming and Upcoding 
Table 1 also illustrates the possibility for strategic behaviour on the part of the hospitals. If 
hospitals can identify a patient’s probable length of stay, then they have an incentive to 
cherry pick or ‘cream-skim’ the low lengths of stay and select against the high lengths of 
stay. This is analogous to cherry picking customers in the health insurance market, which 
appears to have become a feature of the Irish health insurance market [31, 32]. Additionally, 
hospitals may decide to focus on those procedures where variation in length of stay is low, 
owing to lower levels of complexity, ensuring that their revenue flow is stable. 
Despite the opportunities for such activities, Sussex and Farrar [19] found little evidence of 
‘cream-skimming’ in the NHS, or evidence that hospitals were focusing on high margin 
procedures. 
An alternative means for hospitals to maximise revenue would be to influence the reporting 
of the quality of activities performed. That is to say, to exaggerate case complexity thereby 
increasing the quantity of higher priced episodes, a practice known as upcoding [19]. Thus, 
even if hospital activity remains unchanged, recorded activity and subsequent revenues could 
increase. In a survey of health managers, Sussex and Farrar [19] found that some attribute 
this to “better” coding resulting from increased number of coders and more vigilance. 
However, it could also result from misreporting. For example, returning to Table 1 if it were 
possible for a hip replacement that is currently classified as I03B to have been coded as I03A, 
then over €9,000 extra could be added to hospital revenue. 
The incentive to upcode under MFTP is much greater than under the current block grant 
system, where the effect of the case-mix adjustment on hospital income is far less. While no 
evidence of this was found following the introduction of PbR in the NHS [19] , it has been 
well documented in other health care systems [33-35].  
 
Pricing: 
Control of prices gives the purchaser an additional lever to promote their priorities. If the 
purchaser wants more hip replacements to be delivered, then an increase in the price paid per 
hip replacement will help to ensure that this occurs. This could be extended to designing care 
pathways that are more primary care-focused than those currently in place, paying hospitals 
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only for their more modest input into the care pathway, and freeing up resources for the 
delivery of the remainder of the care in primary care. Applications to waiting times or priority 
disease groups can also be considered. 
Under MFTP each hospital submits patient level cost data to the National Information and 
Pricing Office. Before the introduction of best practice-based prices, these data will generate 
national prices. Given the tendency for activity to change annually, there could be volatility 
in national tariff prices year on year, resulting in price uncertainty as experienced in the NHS 
[19]. Increased uncertainty may cause reductions in planned activity by providers, under 
conditions of provider risk aversion. Thus expected increases in activity may not emerge. 
There may be considerable price differentials between hospital groups because some may 
face unavoidably higher costs than the national average. For instance, to recruit specialist 
staff to less attractive, such as remote, areas may require hospital groups to offer them 
positions at higher grades than they would accept in more attractive areas. This unavoidably 
high cost puts hospital groups operating hospitals in less attractive areas at a disadvantage if 
prices are set at a national average and vice versa for hospitals in more attractive areas facing 
lower costs. Over time the application of a national price schedule could lead to regional 
differences in quality of care. 
While the long term objective of Government policy is to have a single tier health system, it 
appears that it will be some time before this is achieved. Currently, private care delivered in 
public hospitals uses an ABF mechanism, whereby a fee per episode of care is negotiated in 
advance with private health insurance companies, and paid for retrospectively. This 
arrangement is subject to the statutory regulation that no more than 20% of total hospital care 
in public hospitals can be delivered to private patients. Therefore, hospitals that are confident 
that they can meet their obligations to public patients have the incentive to earn extra revenue 
from private payers, subject to the 20% limit. Under MFTP, a hospital's preference for 
public versus private patients will depend on the price paid by each payer. Ultimately, if and 
when Universal Health Insurance is introduced, all payers will be private insurance 
companies and the relative preference of hospitals to treat insurance company's patients will 
depend on the relative prices on offer. 
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Cost effectiveness of best practice guidelines 
Best practice guidelines will be designed by the National Information and Pricing Office in 
consultation with stakeholders. As with any good or service, purchase of health care needs to 
be on the basis of value for money (equity issues notwithstanding). Since, a best practice 
clinical pathway is a health technology; it should be subject to the economic evaluation of 
health technologies following the Health Information and Quality Authority (HIQA) 
guidelines.  In its absence, pathways may be developed that over- (or under-) estimate the 
health outcomes produced per unit costs, leading to an inefficient allocation of scarce 
resources. 
 
Compatibility with Government Health Policy 
In examining the compatibility of MFTP with Government health policy, three areas are 
worth noting: Universal Health Insurance, competition and community-focused health care 
delivery. 
Universal Health Insurance, with multiple competing purchasers, is a cornerstone of 
government policy [1]. Retrospective payment of hospitals for episodes of care completed, 
via MFTP, is more compatible with universal health insurance than the current system of 
prospective budgeting. 
The Department of Health [1] states Hospital Groups will compete for patients, driving gains 
in efficiency. The pricing structure in MFTP facilitates this competition. However, given the 
size of hospital groups, the opportunity for intra-group competition for patients is more likely 
than inter-group competition. This will be particularly the case at the level below the hub 
hospital, where many hospitals have similar skills and infrastructure and may compete for the 
same patients. 
As outlined by the Department of Health [1] [2], health care should be delivered at the lowest 
level of complexity. Many chronic disease management programmes are attempting to take 
disease management from a hospital setting to a community setting. In fact it is proposed in 
Future Health [1] that up to 95% of care could be delivered in the community in the future. 
Given experience in Ireland and elsewhere with policy implementation, one can expect 
MFTP to take several years to fully implement. In the interim the proposed system has to be 
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made feasible, which will require considerable investment, as outlined in Section 5 below. 
There is a risk that care pathways in the hospital setting will be prioritised at the expense of 
Primary Care focused care pathways. Thus there is a risk that MFTP will focus resources, 
including managerial effort, to the hospital sector, contrary to the stated priorities of the 
Department of Health. 
In addition, given the shift in incentive structures for hospitals to maximise revenue, while 
cost per episode may decrease, activity may increase which has the potential to increase total 
health sector budget devoted to hospital settings [11]. The Department of Health [3] pre-
empts this with the proposal of setting a global hospital budget. However, this can create a 
silo mentality, leading to cost shifting from hospital to community based services and vice 
versa.  
 
5. Feasibility in Ireland 
 
Data collection, coding and classifying capacity are crucial for the success of MFTP. Given 
that the National Casemix programme in Ireland is in existence since 1993, Ireland’s 20 
years’ experience of using DRGs compares favourably to levels of experience in other 
European countries [5]. Thus, rather than having to build a coding system from scratch, 
MFTP builds on the existing system. However, there are long delays in coding patients in the 
current system and concerns over precision [23, 36]. The intention of MFTP is to pay 
hospitals quarterly for episodes of care completed. If so, a significant investment in coding 
and classifying capacity is required [37]. 
In addition, it is proposed that MFTP will be operated in shadow form in 2013, and fully 
implemented in the hub hospital of each hospital group by 2014  [3]. As of July 2013, 
hospital groups had not been statutorily established and a full list of hub hospitals had not 
been identified. Moreover, significant investment is needed in infrastructure and skills for 
patient-level costing; contracting, commissioning, auditing, IT and performance monitoring 
systems [37].  Between 2007 and 2012 employment in management and administration 
categories in health care (which would incorporate the skill sets mentioned above) decreased 
by 13% [38]. For the same period, expenditure on capital in the health service decreased by 
33% [38]. Thus, the investment required for MFTP faces strong competition.  
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The implementation plan is to go from a pilot in one specialty - Orthopaedics – in selected 
sites, to full implementation across the hospital system. As such, the likelihood of a smooth 
transition seems very optimistic. 
Consequently, it is anticipated that MFTP will be implemented on a phased basis. The 
proposed phasing option seems to be ‘hub’ hospital first and ‘spoke’ hospitals later. An 
alternative, as employed in the NHS [11], would be to introducing the system to a number of 
codes across the entire hospital system and building from there. It would test the system in 
smaller hospitals, which may identify difficulties that are not apparent when applied to ‘hub 
hospitals’. Furthermore, in order to develop a ‘Hospital Group identity’ it might be wise to 
involve smaller hospitals from the start. 
Establishing identity and empowering clinicians through buy-in could minimise the risk of 
opportunistic behaviour, owing to adverse incentives resulting from MFTP discussed earlier 
[39]. U.K. evidence demonstrated that the creation of an altruistic culture and non-adversarial 
relationships between organisation components contributed to fewer than expected incidences 
of opportunistic behaviour [19].  
 
6. Conclusions 
The implementation of MFTP to Irish hospital funding could contribute to a more transparent 
system compared to the existing system. Since the majority of funds entering the hospital 
system are from the Exchequer, this would also contribute to improved democratic 
accountability. Additionally, should hospitals’ relative efficiencies with regards to procedures 
be identified, there is potential for more efficient allocation of resources.  International 
literature indicates that ABF has contributed to reduced unit costs and length of stay; 
increased utilisation of day case opportunities and increased overall activity. No significant 
reductions in quality of care have been detected in literature outside the US system [10].  
Other potential advantages of MFTP include its compatibility with universal health insurance 
and the ability for prices to act as levers in the delivery of purchasers’ priorities. 
However, there are a number of problems with ABF, and MFTP in particular. A poorly 
managed interface with community based services could lead to patients being discharged 
‘sicker and quicker’, and to inappropriate care settings. The incentive for upcoding is greater 
than in the current system and there is an incentive to cream-skim patients and/or procedures. 
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Particular to MFTP is the ambitious timescales laid out by the Government coupled with 
considerable feasibility issues. Significant investment is required in coding skills, IT systems, 
financial management systems and health care contracting. 
Nonetheless a change to hospital financing in Ireland is warranted. The current financing 
system for Irish hospitals lacks transparency. If the downside risks are managed, there is 
potential for MFTP to confer significant benefits to Irish hospital care. 
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